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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of i t  stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed to be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal- all the way to the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
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Abstract. 
The paper contains a description of an evolutionary model of industrial dynamics and a report on 
simulation study of the model. The presentation of the model is partitioned into two sections, in 
the first section we focus on the economic features of industrial development with no 
technological change embedded, extended version of this model with the search for innovation 
process included is presented in the next section. 
In the next two sections results of simulation study on technological regimes and firms entry 
are presented. Technological regimes relate to different types of innovation captured by the 
model, so we consider the cost regime, the technical performance regime and the capital pro- 
ductivity regime. In section I11 we investigate the influence of this different types of innovation 
on development of the industry, particularly on the industry concentration and on the products' 
price distribution. In the next section evolution of industry structure with possibility of firms 
entries is investigated. 
Key words: Evolutionary dynamics, innovation, technological regimes, firms' entry. 
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I. The basic model. 
The model describes the behaviour of a number of competing firms producing hnctionally 
equivalent products. The decisions of a firm relating to investment, price, profit, etc. are based on 
the firm's evaluation of behaviour of other competing firms and the expected response of the 
market. The firm's knowledge of the market and knowledge of the future behaviour of 
competitors is limited and uncertain. There is no possibility of characterizing the limitation and 
the uncertainty of knowledge in statistical terms, e.g. in terms of probability distributions. Firms' 
decisions can only be suboptimal. The decisions are taken simultaneously and independently by 
all firms at the beginning of each period (e.g. once a year or a quarter). After the decisions are 
made the firms undertake production and put the products on the market. The products are 
evaluated by the market, and the quantities of different firms' products sold in the market depend 
on the relative prices, the relative value of products' characteristics and the level of saturation of 
the market. Frequently the products evaluated as the best are not sold in the full quantity offered, 
and conversely, the inferior products are frequently sold in spite of the possibility of buying the 
better ones. But during long periods the preference for better products, i.e. those with a lower 
price and better characteristics, prevails. 
The general structure of the evolutionary model of industrial dynamics is presented in Fig. 1. 
The product's price depends on current innovation being in hands of a firm, on actual structure 
of the market and on the level of assumed production to be sold on the market. The two arrows 
between Price and Production indicate that the price is established in an interactive way to 
provide hlfilling the firms objectives (i.e. to keep relatively high profit in a near hture and a 
further firms development in the long term perspective). Modernization of products through 
innovation and/or initiating a new production through applying a radical innovation depend on 
an investment capacity of the firm. So each firm managing innovation takes into account all 
economic constraints, as they emerge during the firm's development. Therefore it frequently 
occurs that due to economic (financial) constraints some prosperous invention is not put into the 
firm's practice. Technological and economic processes are coupled in the model, and it seems to 
be one of its important features. Current investment capacity is taken also into account by each 
firm in the investment process and the price setting. Success of each firm in the search for 
innovation depends not only on R&D funds spend by each firm to search for innovation but also 
on the extend to make the firms' private knowledge to be public. Making the private knowledge 
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of a firm known to their competitors can in some cases speeds up a whole industrial development 
but also diminishes a firm's incentives to spend more funds to R&D projects. We may expect a 
kind of balanced ratio of making the private firms knowledge to be public. 
Causal relationship between main variables of industrial model presented in the following 
sections are shown in Fig. 2. In some way it is more detaded description of the structure presented 
in Fig. 1. Firm's investment capacity depends on firm's savings and the credit's availability, and 
also, through indirect way, on the firm's debt. Production and investment decisions rely on firm's 
expectations related to future behavior of its competitors, market structure, expected profit and 
the actual trend of firm's market share. Current technical and economic characteristics of products 
offered for sale (in terms of their technical competitiveness, being the measure of products' 
technical performance), and characteristic of technology used to manufacture the products (in 
terms of unit cost of production and productivity of capital) are taken into account in the setting 
process of price, investment and production. Due to inevitable discrepancies between a firm's 
expectation and real behaviour of the market the firm's production offered for sale on the market 
is different than those demanded by the market (it can be either smaller or greater then the 
demand). The firm's saving and its ability to pay current debts depend on real profit and income 
of that firm. 
We distinguish innovation and invention (i.e. a novelty being considered to be introduced into 
practice and become innovation). There are two general ways of searching for inventions, namely 
autonomous, in-house research of each firm and by imitation of competitors. Publicized 
knowledge allows not only for imitation of competitors. The public knowledge can relate also 
to the ways of malung research, the arrow from the publicized knowledge to autonomous research 
indicate that influence. From a number of inventions only small fraction is selected to become 
innovations. An innovation allows to modernize current production but also can initiate new, 
radical way of production, i.e. by implanting essentially new technology. In general each 
innovation can induce reduction of the unit cost of production, increasing of the productivity of 
capital and improvements of technical product performance, but frequently it happens that 
improvement of one factor is accompanied by deterioration of the two other. Therefore usually 
firms face the problem of balancing positive and negative factors of each invention and accept it 
to become innovation if positive factors allows to fulfill firms' objectives. 
FIRMS' DECISIONS 
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It seems that one of the crucial problem of contemporary economics is to understand the process 
of decision making. Herbert Simon states that "the dynamics of the economic system depends 
critically on just how economic agents go about making their decisions, and no way has been 
found for discovering how they do this that avoid direct inquiry and observations of the process." 
(Simon, 1986, p.38). The other problem is how to model this process using some formal 
apparatus. There are a lot of attempts to imitate real decision making processes, some of them 
very sophisticated and very close to reality. Our purpose, being a first approximation, is to catch 
the general and the most essential features of firms' decision making process and at this stage of 
the model's development we see no necessity to feature this process in details. What we propose 
is only first, very rough approximation of the decision making process on the firm's level. This 
proposition does not close the road for hrther development of the procedure modeling decision 
making process in subsequent versions of the model. 
Here we present the procedure of evaluation of production, investment, expected income and 
profit in the succeeding instant of time of firm i selling its product at product price pi(t). The 
problem of choosing the appropriate price pi(t) will be discussed later on. 
(a) Calculation of the product's competitiveness ci(t). 
We distinguish two kinds of a product's competitiveness: technical competitiveness and overall 
competitiveness (or simply competitiveness). The technical competitiveness reflects the quality of 
technical performance of the product on the market. The technical competitiveness depends 
directly on values of the product's technical characteristics, such as e.g. reliability, convenience, 
lifetime, safety of use, cost of use, quality, aesthetic values. The overall competitiveness describes 
the product's attractiveness on the market and depends on technical competitiveness and the 
product's price. Because of our assumption that there is no search for innovation so all products' 
characteristics are constant and the same for all products. This assumption impose that technical 
competitiveness is uniform for all firms. In the next section this assumption will be weakened and 
the technical competitiveness will alter due to emergences of technical innovations. 
Competitiveness, as the measure of products attractiveness, is the greater the smaller is the 
product's price and the better technical performance of this product. We assume that 
competitiveness of products with the price pi(t) is equal to 
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where q is the technical competitiveness (constant during the simulation of the basic model), a 
the elasticity of price in the competitiveness; a is characteristic of the market and describes the 
sensitivity of the market on price fluctuations. 
Let's denote by ci(t) competitiveness of products of firm i at time t, i.e. ci (t) = c (pi(t)). 
(b) Estimation of the average price and average competitiveness. 
It may be said, malung no rudimentary exaggeration, that all man's decisions are made on the 
basis of his expectations, but as Herbert Simon asserts: "economists do not disagree about many 
things, but they disagree about a few crucial things, in particular, how people form expectations." 
(Simon, 1986, p. 504) It is rationale to assume that, in general, each firm does not know anything 
about current and future decisions of competitors. We assume that the decisions of each firm are 
made independently on the basis of the firm's expectations what other firms (competitors) will 
decide. The simplest assumption is that in the next period the competitors will behave in a similar 
way as in the past. Therefore the firm i estimates that in the succeeding period (t,t+l) the average 
price will be equal to 
Similarly, the average competitiveness is expected to be equal to 
where c(t-1) is the market share of firm i in the previous instant of time, pP(t) and cP(t) are trend 
values of average price and average competitiveness, respectively.' It is assumed that the 
prediction of the trend values pP(t) and cP(t) are made outside of the industry and are known to 
all firms. Different formulas to calculate these values are built-in the model (e.g. moving averages, 
linear and exponential trends) but in all simulations presented below the exponential trend 
[A.exp(B-t)] is assumed; values of the average price and the average competitiveness in the last 
5 years of industry development suit to calculate the optimal values of the parameters A and B. 
The equations (2) and (3) enable us to model diversified situations faced by different firms, e.g. 
weight of small firm to form the average price is much smaller then the large firms, so small firms 
are in general 'price takers' in the sense that they assume that the hture average price will be very 
close to the trend value, and vice versa, large firms play, in general, the role of 'price leaders' or 
'price makers' so their weight in formation of the future average price is much more significant. 
(c) Estimation of the global production. 
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After apprehending the average price of all product on the market an estimation of the global 
production sold on the market, i.e the global demand Qd(t), may be done. 
We assume that all firms know the demand hnction and the demand hnction is equal to 
M(t) is an amount of money which the market is inclined to spend to buy products with an 
average price pe(t). We assume that 
where N is a parameter characterizing the initial market size, y the growth rate of the market size, 
and p the elasticity of the average price. 
The consumption theory and results of empirical research (e.g. McConnell, 1984, p. 41 5) show 
that almost all price elasticities in demand functions are negative: for primary needs (like e.g. food, 
clothing) elasticities are between 0 and -1, that of secondary (or "luxury") needs are below - 1. So, 
it may be expected that for commodities fulfilling primary needs P is greater than zero and smaller 
then one and for commodities hlfilling higher order needs (e.g. entertainment) P is smaller than 
zero. 
(d) Estimation of the market share of firm i. 
After estimation of the average competitiveness of all product offered for sale on the market 
and perceiving the competitiveness of its own products firm i may try to estimate its hture market 
share. We propose deterministic selective equations similar to those used in our former models 
of evolutionary processes (Kwasnicki, 1979; Kwasnicka, et al., 1983). The share of firm i in 
period (t,t+l) is equal to 
It means that the share of firm i increase if its products' competitiveness is greater then the average 
competitiveness of all products offered for sale on the market and decline if the competitiveness 
is smaller then the average competiti~eness.~ 
(e) Estimation of the production of firm i. 
Having the expected share and the expected size of the market, firm i is able to estimate 
quantity of production to be accepted by the market (i.e. the supply of production of firm i) on 
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the basis of the simple equation, 
Capital needed to produce output Qf(t) is equal to 
'A' in the above equation is the productivity of capital. Because there is no R&D process then 
firms do not improve the productivity of capital and in the basic model the productivity A is 
constant and uniform for all firms during simulation runs. 
If required growth of the capital of firm i is greater than the investment capability of firm i then 
it is assumed that the capital of firm i at time t is equal to the sum of the investment capability and 
the capital at 1-1, minus the capital physical depreciation (the amortization). For such calculated 
capital the production Qf(t) is recalculated as 
(f) Estimation of the expected income and profit. 
The last step in the decision malung procedure is calculation of the expected income and profit 
of firm i, which are equal to 
rj = QjS(t> <p,(t> -V v<Q,"t>> -11) 
11, = $-Kj( t )  ( p + 6 )  
where I?, is the expected income of firm i at time t+l, Q is the expected profit of firm i at time 
t+l, a t )  the output (supply) of firm i, V the unit production cost (because there is no innovation, 
V is constant and uniform for all firms during the simulation), v(Qs) is the factor of unit 
production cost as the fbnction of a scale of production (economies of scale), q is the constant 
production cost, K.,(t) the capital needed to manufacture the output g"(t), p the normal rate of 
return, 6 the physical capital depreciation rate (the amortization). 
For a given price pi(t) the expansionary investment, the production in the next year, and 
expected profit and income are calculated by applying the procedure presented above. The 
problem needed to be discussed is the way of choosing the products' price p,(t). We assume that 
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a firm takes into account its investment capabilities and evaluates (estimates) values of an objective 
function for different values of price of its products. The price for which the objective function 
reaches the maximum value is chosen by a firm as the price of its products. It is not maximization 
in strict sense. The estimation of values of the objective function is not perfect and made only for 
the next year, so this is not global, once and for all, optimization, the firms apply this rule from 
year to year. 
Different price setting procedures (based on different objective functions and the markup rules) 
have been scrutinized, the results are presented in (Kwasnicki, Kwasnicka, 1992). The results 
suggest that firms apply the following objective function: 
where Fi is the magnitude coefficient (with values between 0 and I), Qf the supply production of 
firm i in year t+l, ri the expected income of firm i at t+l (defined by equation (lo)), QS is the 
global production of the industry in year t, I? the global net income of all firms in year t. r(t)  and 
QS(t) play the role of constants in the equation (12) and provide the values of both terms in this 
equation to be of the same order. 
The 0, function expresses short- and long-term thinking of firms during the decision making 
process (the first and second terms in equation (12), respectively). The plausible values of the 
parameters are a, = 1 and a, = 5 (Kwasnicki, Kwasnicka, 1992); it means that the long term- 
thinking is much more important for the firms survival and that the firms apply flexible strategy 
i.e. the relative importance of short- and long-term changes in the course of firms development 
(the long-term is much more important for the small firms than for the big ones). 
The decision making procedure presented above with the search for the 'optimal' price 
procedure based on the objective concept construct the formal scheme to find the proper value 
of the price. We treat this scheme as an approximation (abstraction) of what is made by real 
decision makers. They of course do not make such calculations from year to year, they think 
rather in the routine mode: "My decisions ought to provide for the future prospects of the firm 
and also should allow income (or profit) to be maintained at some relatively high level". 
Decisions on hture level of production and the future products' price depend on the actual 
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investment capabilities of the firm. There is possible to embody in the model different ways of 
calculation of firms' investment capabilities. We propose to investigate two formulas. One as 
proposed by Nelson and Winter (1982), and Winter (1984) in which the investment capability of 
the firm i in period (t,t+l) is a hnction of profits (II) of the firm i in period (t-1,t) and the second 
in which the investment capability depends on the firm's current saving (SV). Let's call these two 
strategies as the 11-investment and the SV-investment strategies, respectively. 
Investment capability of firm i in the II-investment is equal to: 
IC,(~) = max { 0 ,  6 K,(t - 1)  + p  II,(t-  1)) 
where 6 is the physical capital depreciation, p the coefficient equal to 1 for II, < 0, and equal to 
po for II, > 0. 
The credit parameter p0 is greater or equal to one. If p, is greater then one, firm i takes credit 
if its overall investment &(t) at time t exceeds the sum of the amortization and the profit of the firm 
at (t-I). Nelson and Winter (1982) do not mention anything about the way of taking credit and 
fiture its repaying. As we understand a firm in this model takes credits from banks if required 
investment exceeds its current profit, without taking care on fiture repaying it.. 
We propose to incorporate more explicitly the process of credits taking and its fiture repaying. 
In the SV-investment strategy we assume that at every year a firm spare a fraction of its current 
profit for saving to be invested in hture firm's development. If at any time required investment 
exceeds current savings then the firm takes credit and its debt increases. The debt is repaid within 
assumed period. The savings and debts increase every year accordingly to assumed interest rate 
PI. 
If we assume that credit ought to be repaid on average within p, years then the compensations 
(the debt repay) in the next year is equal to 
The investment capability of firm i at time t depends on current savings SV, and current 
compensations DR,, and is equal to (meaning of parameters 6 and p as in equation (13)): 
IC,( t)  = max { 0,  6 K,( t -  l ) + p  (SV,(t-I) - DR,(t)) } (15) 
It may happen that required investment of firm i exceeds the firms own finds (equal to the sum 
of amortization 6-K,(t-1) and current savings (SV, - DR,)). If this is a case and p is greater then 
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1 the firm takes credit to finance the exceeding investment. Let's denote by ICr, the investment 
financed by credit and by IS, investment financed by the firm's own savings (i.e. the capital 
depreciation finds 6-K,(t-1) excluded). To simplify the calculations, we do not consider the 
structure of debt (i.e. we do not recognize moments of credits' taking), so we assume, as a first 
approximation, that the debt at time t is characterized by its total value, i.e. is equal to 
The debt is diminished by the current repayment and increase accordingly to the interest rate 
(the first tern) and is enlarged by current investment financed by credit, ICr,. At each year the firm 
i spare a fraction of its current profit for savings. We assume that fraction of profit spent for 
savings depends on relation of current savings and firm's capital, the greater savings the less 
fraction of actual profit (if positive) is passed for savings. A parameter ToSave controls the 
fraction of profit for savings. To delimit the amount of money passed for saving SP, we use the 
following formula (the expression exp(0) is a fraction of positive profit spent for saving): 
The savings at time t are reduced by current obligations related to repay the debt DR,, 
multiplied accordingly to the interest rate p,, reduced by the investment financed from firm's own 
resources IS, ,and raised by current savings from profit, so the saving is equal to 
S c ( t )  = (SV,(t - 1 )  -DR,(t)) (1  +p,)-IS,( t)  +SP,(t) (18) 
FIRMS' ENTRY 
In each period (t,t+l) a number of firms try to enter the market. Each firm enters the market with 
assumed capital equal to Initcapital and with the initial price of its products equal to the predicted 
average price. The number of potential entrants (i.e. firms trying to enter the market) is the 
greater the larger is the concentration of the industry. 
In general any firm may enter the market and if firm's characteristics are unsatisfactory then the 
firm is quickly eliminated (superseded) from the market. But due to limited capacity of computer's 
memory we assume a threshold for entrants, namely to control a number of entering firm we 
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assume that a firm enter the market if estimated value of objective 0, of that firm is greater then 
an estimated average value of the objective 0, within the industry.' Making this assumption we 
provide higher competitive environment for all firms - for operating firms and for entrants. 
As the result of competition the market shares of firms with competitiveness smaller than 
average competitiveness decrease, and the shares of firms with competitiveness greater than 
average competitiveness increase. A firm is driven from the market if it does not keep pace with 
competitors (i.e. in the long run its products' competitiveness is smaller than the average 
competitiveness). To limit the number of very small firms we assume also that a firm is eliminated 
from the register of firms if its market share is smaller than some assumed minimum share (e.g. 
0. I%), or ifits current debt exceeds an assumed fraction of the firm's current capital (e.g. 90%). 
COMPETITION OF PRODUCTS IN THE MARKET 
All products manufactured by the entrants and the firms existing in the previous period are put on 
the market and evaluated. Since that time all decisions are left to buyers, whose decisions primary 
depend on the relative values of competitiveness of all offered products, but quantities of products 
of each firm offered for sale are also taken into account. 
We assume that the global demand of products, Qd(t), potentially sold on a market is equal to an 
amount of money - M(t) - which the market is inclined to spend on buying products offered for 
sale by the firms divided by the average price, p(t), of the products offered by these firms, as it was 
presented in the decision making procedure; see equations (4), (4) and (5) defining the demand 
fbnction, where instead of pe(t) it is necessary to place p(t). The only difference is that in the 
decision malung process firms use their estimated values of the average price, as the result of their 
expectations of future market and the competitors behaviours, and here the average price in the 
demand fknction is counted using the whole pool of products offered for sale on the market (i.e. 
the supply). Therefore the average price of products is equal to: 
The global output offered for sale (the supply) is equal to 
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Global production sold on the market is equal to the smaller value of the demand Qd(t) and the 
S ~ P P ~ Y  Q"0, 
The general selection equations of firm competition in a market has the following form (for 
comment see also note 2), 
where c (t) is the average competitiveness of products offered for sale, 
This means that the share (fJ of firm i in global output increases if the competitiveness of its 
products is greater than the average competitiveness of all products present on the market, and 
decreases if the competitiveness is less than the average competitiveness. The rate of change is 
proportional to the difference between the competitiveness of firm its products and average 
competitiveness. 
The quantity of products potentially sold by the firm i on the market (i.e. the demand for 
products of firm i) is equal to 
The above equations are valid if the production offered by the firms fits exactly the demand of 
the market. This is a very rare state and therefore these equations have to be adjusted to states of 
discrepancy between global demand and global production, and of discrepancy between the 
demand for products of specific firm and the production offered by this firm. Equation (24) 
describes the market demand for products of firm i offered by the price pi(t) and with the 
competitiveness ci(t). In general the real production (the supply) of firm i is different then the 
specific demand for its products. The realization of the demand for products of firm i does not 
depend only on these two values of the demand, Qf(t), and the supply, Q(t), but on the whole 
pool of products offered for sale on the market. The alignment of the supply and demand of 
production of all firms present on the market is an adaptive process performed in highly iterative 
and interactive mode between sellers and buyers. In our model we simulate the iterative alignment 
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of the supply and the demand in two stage process in which a part of the demand is fblfilled in the 
first stage, and the rest of the demand is, if possible, fblfilled in the second succeeding stage of the 
alignment. If there is no global oversupply of production then in the first stage of the supply- 
demand alignment process all demands for production of specific firms, wherever possible, are 
fblfilled, but there is still the unsatisfied production of firms which underestimated the demands 
for their products. This part of the demand is fblfilled in the second stage of the supply-demand 
alignment process. At this stage the products of the firms which produce more then the specific 
demand are sold instead of the production unsatisfied by the firms which underestimated the 
demand for their products. 
The supply-demand alignment process is slightly different if the global oversupply of 
production occurs. It seems to us reasonable to assume that in such a case the production of each 
firm sold on the market is partitioned into (1) the production bought as the outcome of the 
competitive process (as described by the equations (22) and (24)), and (2) the production bought 
as the outcome of the non-competitive process (lets call it the cooperative process) - in principle 
this part of production does not depend on the products competitiveness but primarily depends 
on the mass of production offered for sale, i.e. random factors play much important role in 
preference of relevant products to be bought within this part of the production. In general the 
partition of the production of each firm into these two parts depends on the value of the global 
oversupply. The higher the oversupply the larger part of production of each firm is sold on the 
basis of the non-competitive preferences. 
To evaluate the shares of these two parts of production we construct the coefficient w which 
depends on the global demand and the global supply, namely 
Q d (  
w = min { I ,  -L} Q .(t> 
The coefficient w divides the behaviour of the model into two regimes: w is equal to one if the 
demand exceeds the supply, and is smaller than one for the oversupplied market. If there is no 
global oversupply (i.e. w = 1) then, as it was said, the products of the firms which produce more 
than the demand are sold instead of the potential production of the firms which produce less than 
the demand (it is done in the second stage of the supply-demand alignment process, see below). 
If there is global oversupply then maximum w.100% of the demand is supplied by the production 
of each firm in the first, competitive stage of the alignment process, and the rest (I-w)-100% of 
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the demand is supplied in the second, cooperative stage (if such production is available). 
Usually the global oversupply, if occurs, is small so the majority of production is distributed 
under the influence of the competitive mechanisms and only small part is distributed as the result 
of the cooperative distribution. But to understood the necessity of distinguishing the two proposed 
stages of selling-buying process let's consider the following, albeit artificial, situation: with one 
firm exception, the production of all other firms meet exactly the demand for their products. The 
peculiar firm produces much greater then the demand for its products. The question is, what is 
the result of the market selling-buying process? We may assume that the production sold by all 
firms is exactly equal to the specific demands for their products, what is equivalent to assumption 
that the mass of the overproduction made by the odd firm does not influence the behaviour of the 
market. In extreme case we may image that the volume of the production of the odd firm is 
infinite and the rest firms still produce exactly what is demanded. Does it still mean that the 
abundant products will be unnoticed by the buyers and still they will be clung to the infinitesimal 
production of all firms producing exactly what is demanded? It seems to us that more adequate 
description require the incorporation of the assumption that the fhture distribution of products sold 
on the market depends on the level of overproduction of all firms, and particularly the level of 
overproduction of the odd firm. And it seems that in the case of the overproduction of one firm 
its share in the global production sold will increase in the expense of all firms producing exactly 
what is demanded. In the extreme case, when overproduction of the odd firm goes to be infinite 
(i.e. the coefficient w is approaching zero) the only products sold on the market belongs to that 
firm, and the shares of all other firm are going to be zero. But it does not mean that producing 
more then it is demanded is advantageous strategy for the firm and that it is effective weapon to 
eliminate the competitors; in fact the bulk of the overproduction is not sold on the market and lost 
by the firm. In effect the odd firm's profit is much smaller then expected, or even may be negative, 
and after some period the firm's development will be stopped and in the end the firm will be 
eliminated from the market. 
Incorporation of coefficient w enables also the entry of new competitors on the market. 
Without the assumption of the two stage distribution in the supply-demand alignment process the 
entry of new firm might be very difficult, and it would be necessary to add special procedure to 
allow the entry in the case of the global oversupply. In a case of the global oversupply, when all 
firms' production meet the demands for their products, there would be place for the entrants. The 
competition process, as described by the selection equation (22), can not be initiated due to the 
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zero value of the share of the entrant in the previous instant of time, <(t-1). The assumption that 
the (1-w) fraction of the global demand is fulfilled in the cooperative stage of the alignment 
process enable the entry of new firms. Similarly the entry is possible if there is no global 
oversupply (i.e. w = 1). In such a case there is the place on the market for the entrant and, in 
general, all its production is sold on the market. 
We assume that at the competitive stage of the supply-demand alignment process the demand 
is partially hlfilled by production QS:(t), 
Q S / ( ~ )  = rnin {Qis(t),w ~ , ~ ( t )  ) = rnin {Qjs(t),w QS(t).  
c,(t> QS:(~) = rnin {Q,"t),w QS(t)f;(t-1)- ) 
c( t )  
The rest (I-w) fraction ofthe demand may be fulfilled in the cooperative stage if there is such 
production available i.e. if Q(t) > w.Qf(t). We assume that this fraction of the demand is fulfilled 
in the cooperative stage accordingly to the distribution of unsold products in the competitive 
stage. 
After completion of the competitive stage of the supply-demand alignment process the global 
production sold is equal to 
So the unfulfilled global production after the first stage, to be supplied in the second stage of the 
alignment, is equal to 
The unsold production QNi(t) of firm i is equal to 
~ y . ( t )  = min {o, Q,'(t)-w Qid(t)) (29) 
The fraction of unsold products of firm i in the global production unsold in the first stage of the 
alignment process is equal to 
,II QN, < t )  min {o, Qis(t)-w Qid(t)) 
f." = - 
' C Q y , ( t )  C rnin {o, QIs(t)-w ~ , d ( t ) )  
I J 
We assume that the fulfillment of the demand for products of firm i in the cooperative stage of the 
alignment process is proportional to the fraction GI, so 
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Finally the production sold is the sum of production accepted in the competitive and the 
cooperative stages of the supply-demand alignment process, 
The general meaning of the supply-demand alignment process as described above parallels that 
of equations ((22), (23), (24)). If supply exactly meets market demand (i.e. if Qs(t) = Qd(t) and 
Q:(t) = Qf(t) for all i), equations from (25) to (32) are equivalent to equations (22) to (24). 
The market share of the production sold of firm i is equal to 
The real income and profit of firm i is equal to 
K,(t) in eqs. (34) and (35) is the value of capital allocated by firm i to produce the output Q(t), 
so profits are smaller than expected if the firm inappropriately evaluates the required level of 
production and manufactures more than it can sell in the market.4 
Effective capital of the firm is equal to 
Global sales are equal to 
The market share of firm i in global sales is equal to 
fs,(t) = QS,(t> p,(t)lGS(t) 
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11. Innovation and Economic Development. 
Essence of cultural development in general, and socio-economic evolution in particular, lays in 
the creative process of human being. Possibilities of observation of real tissue of creative processes 
is almost impossible. Collection of relevant quantitative data on innovation processes is mostly 
confined to such data as number of researchers, R&D funds, number of patents, etc. Estimation 
of some essential parameters and characteristics (e.g. probability of emergence of innovation 
within assumed period of time) on the basis of such aggregate data is almost impossible. Most 
important, and the most interesting, phenomena of creativelcognitive processes occur in the mind 
of researchers, and these kind of processes are, in generally, out of possibilities of any 
observations. The only way to deal with the creative processes and dare to describe them in more 
or less formal way is to make some arbitrary assumptions, incorporate them into the economic 
model and observe if development of the model resembles the development of real processes. In 
some sense it is a combination of quantitative modelling (based on hard economic data) and 
qualitative modelling (based on heuristic, analogies, and metaphors). This kind of approach is 
proposed in this section, where the extension of the basic model with innovative processes 
embedded is presented. We treat this proposition as the first approximation being the subject of 
fbrther development ('stepwise concretization'). 
The creative process from its nature is the evolutionary process, and as such its description 
ought to be based on proper understanding of the hereditary information. Accordingly to the 
tradition established by J.A. Schumpeter, and S. Winter and R. Nelson we use the term 'routine' 
to name the basic unit of the hereditary information of a firm. The set of routines applied by the 
firm is one of the basic characteristics describing the firm. Each firm searches for new routines and 
new combinations of routines. Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 14) define routines as "regular and 
predictable behavioral patterns of firms" and include in this term such characteristics of firms as 
"technical routines for producing things, [...I procedures of hiring and firing, ordering new 
inventory, stepping up production of items in high demand, policies regarding investment, 
research and development, advertising, business strategies about product diversification and 
overseas investment". Great part of research activity is also governed by routines. "Routines 
govern choices as well as describe methods, and reflect the facts of management practice and 
organizational sociology as well as those of technology." (Winter, 1984) 
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Each firm tends to improve its situation within the industry and in the market by introducing 
new combinations of routines in order to minimize the unit cost of production, maximize the 
productivity of capital, and maximize the competitiveness of its products in the market. 
Productivity of capital, unit cost of production, and characteristics of products manufactured by 
a firm depend on the routines employed by the firm (examples of the product's characteristics are: 
reliability, convenience, lifetime, safety of use, cost of use, quality, aesthetic values). The search 
activity of firms "involve the manipulation and recombination of the actual technological and 
organizational ideas and skills associated with a particular economic context" (Winter, 1984), 
while the market decisions depend on the products' characteristics and prices. We may speak 
about the existence of two spaces: the space of routines and the space of product characteristics.' 
Distinguishing these two spaces enables us to separate firms' decisions from the market's decisions. 
As in the basic model discrete time, e.g. a year or a quarter, is assumed, and the firms' decisions 
relating to investment, production, research finds, etc. are taken simultaneously and 
independently by all firms at the beginning of each period. After the decisions are made the firms 
undertake production and put the products on the market. The products are evaluated by the 
market, and the quantities of different firms' products sold in the market depend on the relative 
prices, the relative value of products' characteristics and the level of saturation of the market. Due 
to imbalances of global supply and demand as well as 'local' imbalances of demand and supply of 
products of a specific firm it may happen that the products evaluated as the best are not sold in 
the f i l l  quantity offered, and conversely, the inferior products are frequently sold in spite of the 
possibility of selling the better ones. But during long periods the preference for better products, 
i.e. those with a lower price and better characteristics, prevails. 
In the model presented below each firm may simultaneously produce products with different 
prices and different values of the characteristics, that is, the firm may be a multi-unit operation. 
Different units of the same firm manufacture products by employing different sets of routines. 
Multi-unit firms exist because of the searching activity. New technical or organizational solutions 
(i.e. new set of routines) may be much better than the actual ones but full modernization of 
production is not possible because of investment constraints on the firm. In such situations the 
firm continues production employing the old routines and tries to open a new unit where 
production, on a lesser scale, employing the new set of routines is started. Subsequently the 'old' 
production may be reduced and after some time superseded by the 'new' production. 
Simulation of industry development in the model is made in discrete time in four 
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(1) Search for the new sets of routines which potentially may replace the 'old' set currently 
employed by a firm. 
(2) Calculation and comparison of the investment, the production, the net income, the profit, and 
some other characteristics of development which may be attained by employing the 'old' and the 
'new' sets of routines. Decisions of each firm on: (a) continuation of production by employing old 
routines or making modernization of production, and (b) opening (or not) of new units. 
(3) Entry of new firms. 
(4) Market evaluation of the offered pool of products. Calculation of firms' characteristics: 
production sold, shares in global production and global sales, total profits, profit rates, research 
funds, etc. 
Beside the first step, the three other are almost exactly the same as in the basic model described 
in the former section. The only difference is that the productivity of capital A, the unit cost of 
production V, and technical competitiveness q are now functions of the routines applied by each 
firm, and may vary accordingly to discovered inventions and introduced innovations. Due to 
innovation and new technologies introduced by firms the modernization investment is also taken 
into account in the decision making process (i.e. beside the expansionary investment related to the 
growth of production we have the modernization investment related to adjusting the 'old' capital 
to 'new' technology). 
SEARCH PROCESS 
We assume that at time t a firm unit is characterized by a set of routines actually employed by the 
firm. There are two types of routines - active, i.e. routines employed by this firm in its every-day 
practice, and latent, i.e. routines which are stored by a firm but not actually applied. Latent 
routines may be included in the active set of routines at a future time. The set of routines is divided 
into separate subsets, called segments, consisting of similar routines employed by the firm in 
different domains of the firm's activity. Examples are segments relating to productive activity, 
managerial and organizational activity, marketing, etc. In each segment, either active or latent 
routines may exist. 
The set of routines employed by a firm may evolve. There are four basic mechanisms of 
generation of new sets of routines, namely: mutation, recombination, transition and 
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transposition. 
The probability of discovery of a new routine (mutation) depends on the research finds allocated 
by the firm for autonomous research, in-house development. The firm may also allocate some 
finds for gaining knowledge of other competing firms and try to imitate (recombination) some 
routines employed by competitors. It is assumed that recombination may occur only between 
segments, not between individual routines, i.e. a firm may gain knowledge about whole domain 
of activity of another firm e.g. by licensing. A single routine may be transmitted (transition) with 
some probability fiom firm to firm. It is assumed that after transition a routine belongs to a subset 
of latent routines. At any time a random transpositior~ of a latent routine to a subset of active 
routines may occur. A more detailed description of the four basic mechanisms of evolution of 
routines is presented in the following sections. 
Research Funds 
It is assumed that R&D finds (R,) allocated by a firm into research (innovation and imitation) are 
a finction of actual firm capital (K,) of the firm. 
Research finds are proportional to a firm's capital if h, and h, are equal to zero. If h, and h, are 
greater than zero small firms allocate a greater percentage of their capital into research and a local 
maximum ofR&D finds will appear near K, = lh,. Total R&D finds are partitioned into finds 
(R" for innovation (mutation) and finds (R: ) for imitation (recombination). The strategy of 
research of firm i at year t is described by the coefficient (g,) of partition of total R&D expenditure 
into innovation and imitation. 
The strategy of research changes from year to year and depends on the actual state of affairs of 
a firm. It is assumed that the share of research on innovation increases if the firm's share in global 
production is increasing (i.e. if assumed position of the firm on a background of other competing 
firm is good). If a firm's share decreases, more hnds are allocated to imitation, i.e. a firm supposes 
that there are other firms applying better technology and it is better and safer to search for these 
technologies. The rate of change of coefficient g, depends on the size of a firm and it is smaller 
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the larger the firm is. 
where gi(t) is the coefficient of R&D funds partition at time t, G is the constant parameter 
controlling rate of change of gi, and ((t) is the share of firm i in global production at time t. 
During any year of searching activity more than one set of new routines r' may be found. The 
number of such alternative sets of routines, the so-called number of experiments, is a function of 
research funds, 
where NoExp is the number of experiments of firm i, e, +, and E, are coefficients with the same 
values for all firms, R, is the R&D expenditure of firm i, and round (x) is a function producing the 
closest integer number to x. 
Mutation 
We assume that routines mutate independently of each other. Since the range of the routines is 
bounded, we numerate all possible routines and assume that the range is from MinRut to MaxRut. 
Let r, denotes the I-th routine in the k-th segment employed by a firm in period (t-1,t). After 
mutation routine r, : 
1. is not changed, i.e. r', = r,, with probability (1-PrMut), or 
2. is changed and is equal to 
x E (-MaxMut, MaxMut) 
with probability PrMutf(2.MaxMut) for every x. 
The probability of mutation of a routine depends on R&D funds allocated by firm i to search 
for innovations, 
where am, (' are coefficients controlling probability of mutation, a n d b  is the probability of 
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mutation related to the public knowledge. 
Maximum scope of search depends also on the funds allocated to autonomous research, and 
we assume that, 
where a", 6 are coefficients controlling the scope of mutation, and b is the scope of mutation 
related to the public knowledge. 
Recombination 
A firm i may get knowledge about the routines of a single segment of a firm j with probability 
PrRec. At the same time the firm i may get knowledge employed by different firms, so new sets 
of routines may consist of routines of different firms. In the model the firm i may apply one of 
three strategies of recombination: 
(1) conditional probability of recombination of segment k of firm-unit i with segment k of 
firm-unit j is proportional to the share of firm-unit j in global production; 
(2) conditional probability of recombination of segment k of firm-unit i with segment k of 
firm-unit j is proportional to the rate of expansion of firm-unit j, i.e. is proportional to the 
derivative of the share of firm-unit j; 
(3) conditional probability of recombination of segment k of firm-unit i with segment k of 
firm-unit j is reciprocal to the number of firms existing in the market, i.e. is equal for each 
firm-unit j. 
The probability of recombination of a segment is a function of R&D funds allocated to imitation: 
PrRec, = a ' + b (45) 
where a', are coeficients controlling probability of recombination, U is the probability of 
recombination related to the public knowledge. 
Transition, Transposition and Recrudescence 
We assume that the probabilities of transition of a routine from one firm to another and the 
probabilities of transposition of a routine (from a latent to an active routine) are independent of 
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R&D funds, and have the same constant value for all routines. In general, the probability of 
transposition of a routine for any firm is rather small. But randomly, from time to time, the value 
of this probability may abruptly increase and we observe very active processes of search for new 
combination of routines. We call this phenomena recrudescence. We view recrudescence as an 
intrinsic ability of a firm's research staff to search for original, radical innovations by employing 
some daring, sometime looking as insane ideas. This ability is connected mainly with the 
personalities of the researchers and random factors play an essential role in search for innovations 
by recrudescence, so the probability of recrudescence is not related to R&D funds allocated by 
a firm to 'normal' research. 
We assume that recrudescence is more probable in small firms than in large ones which spend 
huge quantities on R&D, although by assuming that u, is equal to zero in the below equation we 
get that the probability of recrudescence does not depend on the firm's size and is constant (equal 
to u,). The probability of recrudescence in firm i is equal to, 
PrRence, = u, exp ( - u, K,)  
As a rule mutation, recombination and transposition on a normal level (i.e. with low probabilities 
in long periods) are responsible for small improvements and in short periods of recrudescence for 
the emergence of radical innovations. 
P R O D U C T S '  DIFFERENTIATION AND COMPETITION 
Productivity of capital, variable cost of production and product characteristics are functions of the 
routines employed by a firm. Each routine has multiple, pleiotropic effects, i.e. may affect many 
products characteristics, as well as productivity, and the variable cost of production. 
We assume that the transformation of the set of routines into the set of products' characteristics 
is described by m finctions F,, 
Zd = F d  ( r )  d = 1,2,3 ,..., nr (47) 
where z, is the value of d characteristic, m the number of products' characteristics, and r the set 
of routines. 
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A product's attractiveness on the market depends on values of the product's characteristics and 
its price. In the former section, the products competitiveness (see equation (1)) is a fbnction of 
constant technical competitiveness and varying products' price. In the presence of innovation the 
technical competitiveness varies accordingly to modification of routines made by each firm, or due 
to introducing essentially new routines. Technical competitiveness is an explicit fbnction of 
products' characteristics. As it was said each routine does not influence directly product's 
performance but indirectly through influences of the products' characteristics. We assume the 
existence of a fbnction q enabling calculation of technical competitiveness of products 
manufactured by different firms. We say that fbnction q describes the adaptive landscape in the 
space of products' characteristics. In general this fbnction depends also on some external factors, 
vary in time, and is the result of co-evolution of many related industries. We say that the shape 
of adaptive landscape is dynamic, with many adaptive peaks of varying altitudes. In the course of 
time some adaptive peaks lost their relevant importance, some become higher. 
Similar to the equation (1) the competitiveness of products with characteristics z and price p 
is equal to, 
where q(z) is the technical competitiveness, z a vector of products' characteristics, and a the 
elasticity of price in the competitiveness. 
Due to the ongoing search process, at any moment each firm may find a number of alternative 
sets of routines. Lets denote by r the set of routines actually applied by a firm and by r' an 
alternative set of routines. Each firm evaluates all potential sets of routines r' as well the old 
routines r by applying the decision making procedure presented in the former section. The only 
difference is that values of productivity of capital A, the unit cost of production V, and technical 
competitiveness q are not constant but are modified accordingly to actually considered set of 
routines, either r or r'. For each alternative set of routines the price, production, investment 
(including the modernization investment), and value of objective fbnction are calculated. The 
decision of firm i on making modernization (i.e. replacing the r routines by r' routines) depends 
on the expected value of the firm's objective and investment firm's capabilities. Modernization is 
made if the maximum value of the objective distinguished from the all considered alternative sets 
of routines r' is greater than the value of objective possible to get by continuing the actually 
applied routines r, and if the investment capability of the firm permits such modernization. If the 
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investment capability does not allow to make the modernization then the firm: 
(1) continues production employing the 'old' routines r, and 
(2) tries to open a new small unit where routines r' are employed. Production is started with an 
assumed value of the capital, Initcapital. 
We assume that the productivity function A(r), the cost functions V(r) and v(Q) are not firm 
specific and have the same function's form for all firms. 
To modernize production it is necessary to incur an extra investment. The modernization 
investment depends on the discrepancy between the 'old' routines r and the 'new' routines r'. For 
simplicity of calculation, we assume that the modernization investment IM is non-decreasing 
function of distance between the old routines r actually applied by a firm and the new set of 
routines r'. 
where 11.. 11 is the distance function. 
The research is financed from the current firms income so the relevant equations (34) and (35) 
for the firm's profit Ili and income ri ought to be modified. 
where Qf is the current production of firm i, QS, the production of firm i sold on the market, pi 
the products' price, V(r) the unit cost of production when routines r are applied, K, the capital, Di 
the debt of firm i, R, the research funds of firm i. 
Our model does not include explicitly the notion of labor, considered in economic analysis as 
the classical factor of production. Such important economic characteristics as labor and wages 
ought to be present in any model, and are present in our model, although indirectly, namely they 
are present in the cost functions V(r) and v(Q). At current stage of the model's development it is 
not necessary to disaggregate the cost's functions, although there is still open possibility to isolate 
labor and wages and built them explicitly into the model. It will be done in future development 
of the model as the natural process the model's stepwise concretization. 
It is a kind of tradition that if economists speak on technological progress and innovation they 
distinguish two kinds of innovation - namely product and process innovation. The discrimination 
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of such type of innovation is not relevant to our approach. We focus our interest on innovation 
which influence some operationally defined economic variables such e.g. cost of production, 
productivity of capital or technical product's performance. But, although in hidden form, process 
and product innovation are present in our model - we may say that innovation focused on 
reduction of cost of production, and partly on productivity of capital is related to the process 
innovation, and innovation aiming for better technical performance of products is mainly related 
to the product innovation. 
111. Innovation regimes. 
Three basic kind of innovations are captured by our model, namely innovations leading to: (1) 
reduction of the unit cost of production, (2) advancement of the products' technical performance, 
and (3) increase of the productivity of capital. In general any real innovation causes changes of 
all three features of technological development. We are able to control the type of innovations and 
e.g. to allow for emergence of innovations which cause the changes of only one separated feature 
of progress and concurrently to keep the other two fixed. Therefore we may speak about three 
basic modes of technological development; we name these three modes of development as 're- 
gimes', so we have the cost regime, the technical performance regime and the capital productivity 
regime. In this section we would like to investigate the influence of this different types of innova- 
tion on development of the industry, particularly on the industry concentration and on the 
products' price distribution. To make the results comparable in different simulation runs it is 
assumed that there are no entrants and the competition process is confined to the initial 12 firms. 
The initial condition of simulation are set in such a way that in all the experiments presented in 
this section the innovation process is gradual one, without any jumps - i.e. recrudescence is not 
present and no hlguration is observed. 
The result of this series of experiment are summed up in Table 1. In Fig. 3 the development 
of the variable cost of production, the technical competitiveness and the productivity of capital 
in these three regimes for 'normal' rate of innovations emergence are presented. 
In the simulation runs with the reduction of unit cost of production as the only target of 
innovation activity (technical competitiveness and productivity of capital being constant) two 
modes of development are distinguished - the normal and the fast, related to the rate of cost 
reduction: in the first run, labeled as 'normal', the average annual rate of the unit cost reduction 
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is around 0.6% and in the second run, labeled as 'fast', the cost reduction is around 3.5% annually. 
Reduction of the cost of production leads also to the reduction of price, but the rate of price 
reduction is much smaller then the rate of cost reduction. In the case of normal rate of the cost 
reduction price decrease only 0.25% annually (see Fig. 4a); so in the end of simulation the price 
margin is significantly higher then at the beginning (the pricelcost ratio is equal to 1.7 in the end 
of simulation, compare to 1.3 at the beginning); and in the case of fast rate of cost reduction 
(3.5% annually) the price is reduced only slightly more then 1.5% annually, and the price margin 
in the end of simulation is 3.2. 
Reduction of the cost of production narrows the possibilities of the 'obsolete' firms to apply 
relevant strategies to keep the pace forced by the leaders. Possibility of making the obsolete 
products more competitive through price reduction is very limited, so the non-innovators and 
firms which are not able to imitate the innovation and reduce the costs of production within 
relatively short period are quickly eliminated from the market. The Herfindahl firms' number 
equivalent in this experiment is reduced from initial 12 firms to 4 firms in the end of simulation 
(average value of n, is equal to 7.14 firms). Heavy cost reduction rate, as in the fast mode, leads 
to much quicker elimination of 'obsolete' competitors from the market. In the end of the sim- 
ulation run the Herfindah1 firm number equivalent is equal to 1.06 (there is one big firm and two 
very small competitors - the average n, number equivalent is equal to 2.33 in this run). 
Because of strong tendency to high industry concentration and very limited possibility of 
choosing relevant price strategy by the 'obsolete' firms, the price diversity in the cost regime is not 
very high - the average standard deviation is equal to 1.68% in the first experiment and 2.46% in 
the second one (Table 1 and Fig. 4a). 
On the contrary to the situation in the cost regime the possibilities to choose relevant price 
policy to keep position on the market are much wider in the case of innovations leading to 
improvement of product's technical performance. Reduction of price compensate the temporal 
technical backwardness of product and allow to keep overall competitiveness of obsolete products 
almost at the same level as the advanced ones. This prolongs the period for followers to imitate 
the technology leader. In technical regime two modes of development are tested also - normal 
with the average annual rate ofthe technical competitiveness around 0.7%, and the fast, with the 
annual growth of the technical competitiveness equal to 3.2%. 
The price policy of technological leaders in the technical performance regime helps followers 
to keep the pace oftechnological progress. The leaders increase slightly the price to reach higher 
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profit - they choose the strategy of balanced price rising, to gain higher profit, and concurrently 
to keep the overall competitiveness of their products at relatively high level. So in the technical 
regime we observe two opposite tendencies concerning the price policy - reduction of price by 
followers (to rise their products' competitiveness and to keep their place on the market) and rising 
the price by the leaders (to gain higher profit from their temporary "monopoly position"). This 
leads to much higher diversity of price in these two innovation regimes - compare two pictures 
on Fig. 4a and b. The average standard deviation of price in run with the normal rate of growth 
ofthe technical competitiveness is 3.44%, i.e. slightly more then twice of the relevant value in the 
first experiment in the cost regime, and is over 27% for the fast rate of technical competitiveness. 
Price fluctuations in the first phase of development (Fig. 4b) are due to the mentioned above 
interplay of the two different price policies. The steady growth of the average price in the second 
phase of development (after t = 50) is due to higher concentration of the industry. 
If we provide the conditions for pure competition (e.g. through allowing free entry of new 
firms) the price fluctuate around the equilibrium value, as it is in the initial phase (up to t=50) of 
the simulation run presented in Fig. 4b. So it may be said that contrary to the steady trend of price 
diminishing as observed in the cost regime no such mode of price development is observed in the 
technical regime - many simulation runs confirm the finding that fluctuations of price around the 
equilibrium value are typical pattern of development in the technical regime. 
Rapid technical progress leads to much greater concentration of the industry, for 'normal' 
technical improvement the average value of Herfindahl firms number equivalent is 8.9 firms, but 
for rapid technical progress this number is 2.39. The price diversity in this run is almost 8 times 
greater then for the normal rate of change of technical competitiveness (over 27%). 
Ifwe compare the modes of development in the cost regime and the technical regime we then 
see that the cost reduction leads to relatively high concentration of the industry, high price 
reduction and relatively small diversity of price and almost reverse tendencies are observed in the 
technical regime - smaller concentration, almost no price reduction (in the long-term perspective) 
and high diversity of price. 
Contrary to the two discussed regimes, the capital productivity regime may be called neutral. 
Even high rate of productivity growth does not lead to large industry concentration. For 'normal' 
rate of the productivity growth (0.6% annually) the concentration of industry is all the time almost 
the same (the Herfindahl number equivalent in the whole period of simulation is very close to 12 - 
see Table I), and even relatively high rate of the productivity change leads only to slightly greater 
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concentration (for almost 4% annual growth of the productivity of capital the average Herfindahl 
number is 11.32, i.e. very close to the initial 12 firms). The strategy of productivity improvement 
seems to be rather ineffective weapon to eliminate the competitors from the market although it 
provides comparable good economic effects, e.g. the profit is almost the same as in the case od 
technical regime and even slightly larger then in the case of the cost regime (see Table 1). But as 
it was observed in numerous simulation runs cost reduction (especially very rapid) leads to much 
higher concentration of the market and enable to gain larger profit due to (temporary) monopoly 
position on the market. 
The results of simulation runs of the productivity regime seem to be in f i l l  consistency with the 
statistical analysis of economic growth made in the 1950s. From this point of view our model and 
simulation results may hint explanations of the results of this statistical study, particularly of the 
results which are with evident friction to the neoclassical view of growth along the production 
function - that the ratio of capital engaged to the volume of production is constant during 
analyzed period. This view is also supported by the results of simulation runs with so called 
'complex' innovation regime, i.e. in which simulation conditions are crated in such a way that 
routines modifications influence concurrently the unit cost of production, the products' technical 
performance and the productivity of capital. 
A number of simulation runs for the 'complex' regime were done and a large spectrum of 
behaviour is observed, the results of four of them are presented in Table 1. Random factors play 
essential role in this regme, frequently an innovation generated at the beginning of the simulation 
decide on the future path of development of the whole industry (i.e. this innovation create a 
chreod, in terminology of Waddington). Rarely we observe harmonious development leading to 
moderate rates of improvement of the productivity of capital (A), the technical competitiveness 
(q) and reduction of the unit cost of production (V). The main reason is that probability of 
emergence of innovation which enable simultaneous reduction of the cost of production, 
increasing of the technical competitiveness and the productivity of capital is very small. The most 
typical situation is that firms find inventions enabling an advance of only one of these features 
(either q, V, or A), and the improvement of the two other features is done in succeeding stages 
of development of the basic innovation as the results of fiture research efforts leading to 
improvements of that basic innovation. The most frequent mode of development is that firms 
accept much more eagerly inventions leading to cost reduction and/or to rising technical competi- 
tiveness. The productivity of capital is frequently kept almost at the same level. The results of such 
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typical situation are presented in Table 1 (the "complex" regime labeled as normal (A)) and in Fig. 
5. An average productivity of capital (equal to 0.11) is only slightly greater then the initial value 
(0. lo), but development of the productivity of capital is not static, as we see on Fig. 5c it 
fluctuates. The fluctuations of the productivity of capital, as well as cost of production and 
technical competitiveness, are due to intertwined (pleiotropic) character of impact of innovation 
on industry development in the complex regime. In the initial phase of development cost reduction 
and improvement of technical performance are observed (Fig. 5a and b). In the end of the fourth 
decade an inventions reducing significantly cost of production is found. But the reduction of the 
unit cost of production in that invention is coupled with decreasing of the technical competitive- 
ness, nevertheless the invention is accepted purely on basis of economic reasons. As it turned out 
it was very difficult to improve the technical performance starting from that formerly accepted 
innovation. In the second half of the simulation period the firms' innovative efforts are concentrat- 
ed on the cost reduction and the technical competitiveness is kept almost constant. If we compare 
the results of the former ('pure') innovation regimes with the results of the 'complex' regime we 
see much higher discrepancy of the frontier of technological development (as measured by the 
maximum of technical competitiveness, the maximum productivity of capital, and the minimum 
of the unit cost of production) and the average performance of the industry. 
Analysis of the simulation results for the complex regime suggests that there is no stable pattern 
of behaviour, random factors play essential role and the behaviour of industry (e.g. such 
characteristics as profitlcapital rate, industry concentration, price diversity) depends strongly on 
a prevailing innovation regime, e.g. if due to purely random factors R&D efforts result in 
emergence of innovation reducing the unit cost we observe higher industry concentration, but if 
due to random factors the technical regime prevails then we may observe higher diversity of price 
and smaller tendency to higher industry concentration. 
The simulation results for different innovative regimes have revealed interesting property of 
the industry development related to the supply and demand balance. For the cost regime and for 
the productivity regime the supply to demand ratio fluctuates around the equilibrium value (see 
Fig. 6% and b), and the mode of S/D ratio development does not depend on the rate of change. 
From the qualitative point of view the picture is almost the same for slow, medium and large rates 
of innovation. An average value of the S/D ratio for these two regimes is always slightly above 
1 (e.g. for the cost regime (fast) it is equal to 1.0014). Very similar picture of development is for 
small and medium (labeled by as the normal) rates of growth of technical competitiveness (see Fig. 
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6c), the average value of S/D in the whole period of simulation is equal to 1.0003. But, for some 
reason, for fast technical development instability od the supply and demand occurs. The value of 
S/D ratio drops below 1 and is the smaller the faster is the development, e.g. for the average 
annual rate of development equal to 1.5% the average value of S/D is 0.984, and for rather fast 
development (3.2%) the average value of S/D ratio is 0.927 - development of the ratio in this case 
is presented in Fig. 6d. To make supply and demand more balanced we have tried to change the 
firm's decision strategies in many ways (e.g. by making much stronger the relationship of the 
expected development of price with the current imbalance of supply and demand) and the results 
were always very similar -.the average value of S/D ratio is always significantly smaller then 1. It 
seems that the firms act as to leave the 'free place' for newcomers, to make the entry of new firms 
easier. And it turns out to be true, the situation is significantly better if we allow the entry of new 
firms. The development of the S/D ratio in this case is presented in Fig. 6e. The average value of 
S/D in this run is significantly smaller (0.983). The free entry of new competitors causes also 
much quicker recovery from the deep imbalance and quicker development of the industry toward 
the equilibrium. 
1V. Entry and the Industry Structure 
As we have seen in the previous experiments, the acquiescence for firms' entry greatly influences 
the values of important characteristics of industry development, such as profit, price structure, and 
of the supply and the demand balance (Table 1 and Fig. 6). It occurs that opportunity of free entry 
of new competitors greatly influences also the industry structure, especially in the periods of 
radical innovation emergence. To investigate how industry structure is formed under conditions 
of the free entry the following two simulation runs with specific initial conditions were prepared. 
In both runs, in the first phase of simulation (i.e. up to t = 30) only incremental innovations are 
introduced (i.e. they cause only moderate: reduction of the cost of production, increase of 
technical competitiveness, and rise of the productivity of capital). In the 30th year the recrudes- 
cence mechanism of innovation generation is activated. In effect, radical innovation emerges fol- 
lowed by quick and significant reduction of the cost of production, rise of the technical 
competitiveness and rise of the productivity of capital within the whole industry. Conditions of 
simulation in the two runs were prepared in such a way that in both experiments the changes of 
the three characteristics of industry development are very similar, as presented in Fig. 7. It is true 
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that emergence of such radical innovation in real industrial processes is very improbable 
phenomenon, but to see more clearly the impact of innovation on the development of the industry 
such extremely radical innovation emergence was intentionally forced. The only difference in the 
initial conditions created in these two runs is that in the first simulation run no entry of new firms 
is allowed, contrary to the second run where the free entry of new competitors is enabled. 
Naturally, the first difference in the industrial development of these two runs lies in the number 
of firms and firms' units, what is presented in Fig. 8. If no entry is allowed (the upper chart) all 
12 initial firms are present in the market up to t = 65, but since that year more and more firms are 
eliminated from the market, so at the end of simulation only two of them are present. Diversi- 
fication ofthe industry structure due to emergence of innovations is observed from the beginning 
of simulation, but in the first phase of development, i.e. when only incremental innovations 
emerge, the diversification is relatively small and the concentration grows only gradually (see n, 
- the Herfindahl firms' number equivalent in the upper chart). With the four years' delays, after 
the emergence of the radical innovation, a significant diversification of firms' size is observed, no 
firm is eliminated but some of them reach significant shares on the market so the concentration 
grows very quickly. The radical innovation causes also emergence of multi-unit firms - as can be 
seen in the upper chart from t = 30 more and more firms become multi-unit operations (there 
were up to 16 units present). Even at the end of the simulation, when only two firms compete on 
the market, each firm has two units. The bulk of the production is made in the modern units but 
still small fraction of production is based on the obsolete techn~logies.~ The growth of the number 
of firms in the free entry simulation run is presented in the bottom chart of Fig. 8. 
In the first phase of development of the industry new firms enter the market only incidentally. 
But since the emergence of radical innovation, firms grow very quickly in number, up to the maxi- 
mum of 32 firms. Concurrently to the growth of the number of firms a similar increase of the 
number of units is observed (there are maximum 41 units). At the end of simulation 28 firms are 
present on the market. Some of the initial firms adopt the new technology, open new units, and 
are present on the market up to the end of simulation but majority of the initial firms are eliminat- 
ed from the market, so at the end of simulation the number of units is very close to the number 
of firms. Diversification of the industry in the first phase of development is very similar to that in 
the run with no entry, since the emergence of the radical innovation similar tendency towards 
higher concentration is also observed, but due to the increasing number of successfbl entrants the 
concentration is never so high as in the former run - the minimum Herfindahl index in this run 
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is equal to 6 firms. Around t = 40 the process of concentration growth is stopped and since that 
moment a steady tendency towards pure competition is observed. At the end of simulation the 
Herfindahl index of concentration is equal to 10 firms, i.e. five times greater than in the run with 
no entry. 
The shares of the eight largest firms in both simulation runs, which are presented in Fig. 9, give 
also some view on the development of structure of industry. As it was mentioned before (Fig. 8, 
Table 2, and note 6) at the end of simulation the Herfindahl firms' number equivalent in the run 
with no entry is equal to 2, these two firms which survived are labelled as 1 and 10 (see the left 
chart in Fig. 9). What needs to be notified is that these two firms were not the biggest ones just 
at the moment of emergence of radical innovation, in fact both firms were steadily eliminated from 
the market (see the first phase of industry development in the left chart of Fig. 9). The innovation 
was found by firm 1 and applied at t = 30; the fact that the radical innovation was invented by 
small firms is partly due to our assumption that the probability of emergence of radical innovation 
is greater for small firms. The award of being the first innovator is greater profit and the largest 
share on the market. The only firm which successfblly adopted new technology and followed the 
first innovator is firm 10, all other firms, in spite of their relative advantages at the moment of 
emergence of radical innovation, are eliminated from the market. So at the end of simulation the 
industry represents the case of classical duopoly. 
The picture is radically different in the case of free entry. The first firm which applied the 
radical innovation in this run is firm 5 (the right chart in Fig. 9), some other firms quickly followed 
this innovation, but as it turned out all the 'old' firms are eliminated from the market and their 
places are captured by newcomers.' 
As a result of stronger competition the old firms are quickly eliminated from the market, so 
within the eight largest firms operating on the market at the end of simulation there is only one 
old firm (i.e. the founder of the advanced technology, firm 5). The distribution of firms' shares 
at the end of simulation is almost balanced, the Herfindahl number equivalent is equal to 10.12 
at the end of simulation - see Table 2, the share of the largest firm in the last year is around 15%, 
five other firms have only slightly smaller shares (from 9% to 14%), and late followers have shares 
around 7%, but, due to small improvements introduced by them, their shares grow significantly 
quicker than those of all other firms. Up to the moment of emergence of radical innovation the 
supply and the demand are almost balanced in both simulation runs (see Fig. 10). Emergence of 
the radical innovation also causes an extreme increase of the technical competitiveness. As we 
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have shown in the previous section with the simulation of technical performance regime the quick 
growth of technical competitiveness causes large imbalance of the supply and the demand (see 
Fig. 6 d and e). This imbalance is also observed in the two discussed simulation runs after 
emergence of the radical innovation. If no new competitors enter the market we observe a kind 
of stabilization of the supply-demand imbalance at the level of 3% (the S/D ratio is around 0.97 
- see upper chart of Fig. 10) but if the entry of new firms is allowed we observe the tendency to 
balance the supply and demand (bottom chart of Fig. 10 after t = 40). 
The average value of the S/D ratio after the emergence of radical innovation is 95.9% in the 
no-entry run and 99.1% in the free entry run. The possibility of free entry causes also much 
smaller maximal imbalance just after the emergence of radical innovation. The minimum value of 
S/D ratio is equal to 90% if no competitors enter the market and is equal to 96% if free entry is 
allowed. 
The free entry causes also different development of price and its structure within the industry 
(Table 2). In both runs the price is only slightly reduced in the first phase of development, due 
to incremental reduction of the unit cost of production (see both charts in Fig. 11). The 
emergence of radical innovation causes significant reduction of the unit cost of production and 
as it might be expected this ought to result in the parallel significant reduction of the price. The 
process of price reduction occurs in the first years after the emergence of radical innovation, but 
due to higher concentration of the industry it is stopped in the run with no entry allowed. The 
tendency towards price reduction caused by the cost reduction is neutralized by the reverse 
tendency towards greater industry concentration. It is not the case in the simulation with free entry 
allowed, the price is quickly reduced just in the first period after the emergence of radical 
innovation and is still reduced (although not so quickly) in the following decades due to 
incremental reduction of the unit cost of production and more competitive conditions on the 
market (smaller concentration of the industry). Emergence of the radical innovation causes also 
significant increase of the diversity of price. In the simulation with no entry the high diversity 
occurs just after the emergence of the innovation and is kept almost on the same level during the 
following whole period up to the end of simulation (see left chart of Fig. 11). Contrary to the 
conservation of the structure of prices within industry in the case of no entry the continuous 
tendency to reduce the diversity of price is observed if free entry is allowed (the right chart in Fig. 
12, compare also relevant values of the standard deviation of price in Table 2). 
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Notes. 
1. The expressions in eqs. (2) and (3) have the same mathematical form for each firm. It is 
simplification, made by us intentionally to catch the most essential features of the industrial 
processes. From evolutionary perspective the formulas ought.to be firm's specific in which the 
knowledge (firm's routines) and firm's experience ought to be embedded. We hope to make the 
next 'stepwise concretization' in this direction after gathering the results of first elementary 
experiments of the model. 
2. There is possibility to apply stochastic selective equations. Probably the stochastic equations 
would be closer to reality due to essentially random process of 'meeting' specific product with 
specific buyer, but at actual level of development of the model the deterministic selective equations 
catch the problem and give satisfactory results. The proposed selective equations may be treated 
as first approximation and there is still open possibility to make them stochastic after thorough 
investigation of the deterministic model. Our intention is that at the initial stage of the model's 
enquiry the random factors ought to be related only to the innovation process, to enable full 
evaluation of the influence of innovation on the behaviour of the model. From its nature the 
search for innovation is a stochastic process and assumption of deterministic process of 
innovations' emergence leads to significant departure of the model's behaviour from patterns of 
development observed in real processes. 
3. It may be expected that similar threshold exist in real industrial processes. 
4. There arise the question what is done with the outstripped production. We assume that this part 
of production is lost. It is possible to incorporate the backlogs into the model, but this leads to 
much greater model's complexity in the presence of innovations. The production may be 
modernized due to applied innovations, so it would be necessary to remember the quantities of 
orders and unsold production at different instants of time together with its technical 
characteristics. It seems that our assumption on the outstripped production does not lead to large 
errors, bearing in mind that (1) the model is focused on long term industry development, (2) 
yearly overproduction is normally not very high, and (3) to consider backlogs and delivery delays 
it would be necessary to take into account also all related costs e.g. of storing of the not sold 
production. 
5. A space of routines and a space of characteristics play in our model an analogous role to a 
space of genotypes and a space of phenotypes in biology. The existence of these two types of 
spaces is a general property of evolutionary processes (Kwasnicka, Kwasnicki, 1986). Probably 
the search spaces (i.e. spaces of routines and spaces of genotypes) are discrete spaces contrary to 
the evaluation spaces (i.e. space of characteristics and space of phenotypes) which are continuous 
spaces. The dimension of the space of routines (space of genotypes) is much greater then the 
dimension of the space of characteristics (space of phenotypes). As some simulation experiments 
reveal, big differences in the dimensions of the two spaces play important role in long term 
evolution and among others enables escape from so-called evolutionary traps. 
6. The exact values at the end of simulation are as follows: for the largest firm (no. lo), the 
market share in the global production of the modern unit is 45.2% and the price of product 5.67 
(the overall competitiveness of the modern production is 0.1222), in the 'obsolete' unit 6.3% of 
the global production is made, and the price of product is much lower - 3.25 (but due to the lower 
price the overall competitiveness is only slightly smaller than the modern production, 0.1 1 9 ,  for 
the second largest firm (no. 1) the relevant values are very similar, the market share of the modern 
unit is 42.4% and the product price 5.7 (the overall competitiveness is 0.1218), in the 'obsolete' 
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unit 6.1% of the global production is made, and the product price is 3.15 (the overall 
competitiveness is 0.1 14). 
7. The firm labelled by 10 at the end of the simulation, in the right chart, is in fact the new firm, 
the old firm with the same label 10 was eliminated from the market at t = 59, and its place is 
occupied by new firm which entered the market at t = 68 - in fact this new firm becomes the 
second largest firm with the share only slightly smaller than that of the leader. 
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Table 1. Price and industry structure in different innovation regimes. 
n, IIlC Price Price A q v 
st.dev. 
% % max max min 
Variable cost 
normal 7.14 0.617 5.37 1.68 0.100 0.32 2.59 
fast 2.33 -0.795 2.73 2.46 0.100 0.32 0.44 
Technical perjbrmance 
normal 8.90 1.847 6.62 3.44 0.100 0.58 5.00 
fast 2.39 10.610 7.42 27.45 0.100 8.49 5.00 
fast with 
entrants 9.90 -0.544 6.38 12.91 0.100 14.34 5.00 
Productivity ofcapital 
normal 12.00 1.672 6.10 2.10 0.177 0.32 5.00 
fast 11.16 6.932 5.49 4.50 1.160 0.32 5. 0 0 
"Complex" 
normal(A) 2.04 3.232 4.12 7.28 0.1 12 0.64 1.46 
normal(B) 9.04 5.883 6.17 4.05 0.175 0.44 4.25 
fast(A) 3.10 11.756 4.04 9.15 0.384 0.82 2.60 
fast(B) 4.35 0.833 3.30 4.95 0.153 0.92 0.58 
........................ 
Note: values o f f ~  number equivalent n,, the ratio of ProfitICapital IIIC, and 
Price are average values in the whole period of simulation from 0 to 100. 
Table 2. No entry - free entry experiment 
n, IIIC Price Price A q v 
st.dev. 
% % max max min 
no entry 
0- 100 3.08 14.30 5.67 11.64 0.18 3.60 2.99 
95- 100 2.00 26.48 5.37 15.21 0.18 3.60 2.90 
j?ee entry 
0- 100 9.04 0.23 4.88 8.92 0.17 3.69 3.12 
95- 100 10.12 0.31 4.01 6.37 0.17 3.70 3.12 
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Fig. 1. General structure of the evolutionary industrial model 
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Fig. 4. Price for different innovation regimes: cost (a), technical performance (b), and productivity (c) 
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Fig. 5. Variable cost of production (a), technical competitiveness (b), and productivity of capital (c) in the 
"complex" regme 
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Fig 7. Cost of production (a), technical competitiveness (b), and productivity of capital (c) 
in 'no entry - free entry' experiment 
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Fig. 9. Market shares of the eight largest f m s  in the no entry - free entry experiment 
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Fig. 10. Supply to demand ratio in the no 
entry (upper chart) - free entry (lower chart) 
experiment 
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